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Abstract 	
The Palestinian refugee crisis is considered one of the oldest, largest, and most 
complicated refugee issues in the world. Hundreds of thousands of Palestinians have been 
displaced as a result of the 1948 and 1967 wars between Israel and the Arab states. 
Before fleeing their homes, Palestinians were persecuted and intimidated by the Israeli 
army in 1947 and 1948, causing people to flee to different neighboring geographical 
areas such as the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. The UNRWA, a 
UN-associated entity, was established and began operations on May 1, 1950 to support 
relief efforts benefiting the estimated 750,000 Palestinian refugees that were recognized 
by the international community in the Middle East. According to the UNRWA, that 
number has increased today to reach approximately 5 million Palestinian refugees. The 
vast majority of these refugees are not allowed to return to their pre-1948 hometowns. 
There was no resettlement or real rehabilitation in the places where they had sought 
refuge, except for limited resettlement efforts in Jordan. Therefore, the right of return to 
Palestinian refugees is one of the most important issues to be resolved in permanent 
peace negotiations between Israel and Palestine. For 70 years, the Palestinian and Israeli 
sides have been trying to reach a solution to the predicament of Palestinian refugees who 
were displaced in 1948, and again after the 6 Days War in 1967, with no tangible success. 
Although the international community has affirmed the right of return for Palestinian 
refugees in multiple resolutions, continuous denial for any responsibility is the stance of 
past and current Israeli governments. While Palestinians demand the application of the 
right of return, the State of Israel denies any acceptance of responsibility due to several 
ideological, philosophical and security concerns. Thus, the issue of Palestine refugees 
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remains unsolved to date, with no clear path for future solutions. This work is aimed to 
present the facts and earlier literature, followed by an analysis of the underlying reasons 
for Israel’s denial of the right of return, and ending with practical and feasible solutions 
for applying the right of return for the Palestinian refugees.  																																						
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1. Background 
1.1. History of Palestine 
 
Part of the Levant region and located on the Mediterranean Sea, historic Palestine 
has long been known for its strategic and geographic location. Millions around the world 
from Islamic, Christian and Jewish faiths consider the territory between the Jordan River 
and the Mediterranean Sea to be the Holy Land. Additionally, the central and strategic 
geographic location of this territory connecting Asia, Africa and Europe resulted in 
increased interest in controlling that region of the world. Throughout history, the Levant 
region, has suffered many colonial invasions and wars, ranging from the Canaanites and 
Ancient Egyptians, through the Romans and crusaders, and finally when the Ottomans 
invaded Palestine in the year 1519 (Ishida, 1999, p. 14-15). The period of Ottoman rule 
lasted for 401 years and is considered one of the most important periods of modern 
Palestinian history (Afyoncu, 2018, para. 3) 
 
Palestine under Ottoman rule witnessed unprecedented prosperity, such as the 
rebuilding of the Jerusalem Wall by Suleiman the Magnificent in 1537 (Israel Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, n.d.). However, it was not until the reign of Sultan Selim, and his son 
Sultan Sulaiman al-Qenawi, that the empire was at the peak of its strength and prosperity. 
For instance, the number of schools in Jerusalem alone was estimated to have reached 69 
during Ottoman rule. Castles and forts that were destroyed during the invasion and the 
Crusades of Palestine were renovated and expanded. Although most of the population 
was Muslim, who were about 145,000, there were also about 5,000 Christians and an 
equivalent number of Jewish individuals living in harmony and peace in or around 
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Jerusalem in the 1530s (Pergola, 2001, p. 5). According to the Israeli Foreign Ministry 
and the Jewish Virtual Library records,   
 
“At the outset of the Ottoman era, an estimated 1,000 Jewish families lived in the 
country, mainly in Jerusalem, Nablus (Shechem), Hebron, Gaza, Safed (Tzfat) 
and the villages of Galilee. The community was comprised of descendants of 
Jews who had never left the Land as well as immigrants from North Africa and 
Europe.” (The Jewish Virtual Library, Pre-State Israel: Under Ottoman Rule 
(1517-1917), para. 1) 
 
After the death of Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent in 1566, 50 years after his 
accession to the Ottoman Empire, the empire entered a period of decay and 
administrative corruption, highlighted by repression of the rulers and army. Palestinians 
struggled during the remaining 350 years of Ottoman reign in conditions that turned the 
region from bad to worse. At the end of the eighteenth century, Napoleon Bonaparte's 
attempt to establish his empire in the Near East, starting with invading Egypt and then 
Palestine, led him to promise to establish a homeland for the Jewish diaspora in Palestine, 
allegedly in return for funding from the Rothschilds for his campaigns. (The Jewish 
Virtual Library, Pre-State Israel: Under Ottoman Rule, n.d.) 
 
However, the influx of Jews into Palestine began during the Ottoman rule. The 
first Jewish settlement in Palestine was a piece of land granted by Sultan Abdul Majeed I 
in 1855 to a Jewish Englishman who worked as a consul in Istanbul, namely Moses 
Montefiore (Ameesh, 2010, para. 1). The original purpose behind granting the land by the 
Sultan was to establish a hospital for the Jewish people of Jerusalem. However, another 
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hospital had already been built to serve the Jewish community around the same time the 
land was granted, and instead, the Jewish Quarter was built. Therefore, it is considered 
that Montefiore, the English Jewish man and philanthropist, was the first to lead the 
Jewish settlement campaign in Jerusalem, facilitated by support from the wealthy Jewish 
minority in Europe and America (Shmuel, 2013; “The Montefiore Censuses”, n.d., para. 
2). 
 
The Ottoman Empire went through several phases of bad government practices 
and leadership, consequently destroying the once mighty power. Relations between Arabs 
and Turks also deteriorated, not only in Palestine, but also across the region. Hussein bin 
Ali and other prominent Arab leaders staged a revolt against Ottoman rule throughout the 
Middle East. Furthermore, Hussein and the Arab leadership struck an alliance with 
Britain to grant them self-governing rights in the Levant upon liberation from Ottoman 
rule. Britain agreed to this, but secretly betrayed the Arabs and agreed with France and 
Russia to divide the Levant in what became known as the Sykes-Picot Agreement. The 
Great Arab Revolt against Ottoman Empire was declared in 1916. At the end of World 
War I, Ottoman rule ended, which marked the end of the entire Islamic Caliphate. The 
Middle East was divided and governed by Britain or France as dictated by the Sykes-
Picot Agreement terms. However, it was not until the signing of the Treaty of Sèvres that 
Palestine was assigned under the British mandate in 1920 and the territory became knows 
as Mandatory Palestine (Morris, 2004).  
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1.2. Mandatory Palestine 
 
Palestinians say that their modern-day suffering began since Palestine was placed 
under the British Mandate in 1920. Palestinians believe that Britain had supported the 
Zionist movement and its trends and aspirations from early on as it was forming in 
Europe, despite British promises for the Arab leaders to establish their own state in 
Palestine. During the British occupation of Palestine, then Secretary of State Arthur 
Balfour was heavily influenced by the Zionist ideology. He pledged to grant the Jewish 
minorities a state of their own in Palestine in the form of the Balfour Declaration of 1917 
(Balfour Declaration Letter, 1917). The Declaration of Balfour represents the beginning 
of the Zionist-Palestinian conflict, long before the State of Israel was founded, and 
remains to be a very controversial act until this day. As described by the Palestinian-
American scholar Edward Said:  
 
“The Balfour Declaration was made a) by a European power b) about a non-
European territory c) in a flat disregard of both the presence and wishes of the 
native majority residents in that territory, and it took the form of a promise about 
the same territory to another foreign group, so that this foreign group might, quite 
literally, make the territory a national home for the Jewish people." 
(Khatchadourian, 2000, p. 2) 
However, despite the fact that Secretary Balfour did indeed promise the establishment of 
a Jewish state in Palestine as evidenced in his letter to one of the Zionist movement 
leaders, Balfour also emphasized that the rights of Palestinians should be protected.  
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“I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf of this Majesty’s 
Government, the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist 
aspirations which has been submitted to, and approved by, the Cabinet. His 
Majesty’s Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a 
national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavors to facilitate 
the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be 
done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish 
communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any 
other country. I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the 
knowledge of the Zionist Federation.” (Balfour, 1917) 	
 
Following the Balfour Declaration, the angry Palestinian community felt betrayed 
and began to organize a revolution against the British forces, led by Amin al-Husseini. 
Occasional clashes also took place between the Palestinians and Jewish immigrants, who 
were increasing in numbers (estimated to have reached 175,000 in 1931, more than 
doubling the 84,000 Jewish residents as of 1922). At the same time, the Palestinian 
Muslim and Christian population was estimated to be 850,000 in 1931 (Pergola, 2001, p. 
5). Furthermore, the idea of Jewish immigration was widely welcomed by Britain and 
other nations, because of the anti-Semitic movement in Europe. Hitler's crimes, the 
Holocaust, and the persecution of Jews in Europe helped to gain momentum and support 
to the establishment of a national homeland for the Jews in Palestine (Morris, 2004).  
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All this resulted in increased anger on the Palestinian side, which led to the 
eruption of the Arab revolution in 1936. Britain quickly attempted to absorb the 
revolution by sending a commission of inquiry to Palestine, which later became known as 
the Peel Commission, led by Lord Peel in 1936. The main task of the Commission was to 
investigate and offer solutions to the complicated situation on the ground. In 1937, The 
Peel Commission recommended partitioning Palestine into a Jewish state on 20% of the 
land between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River, and a Palestinian state where 
Palestinians receive 70% of the land. The remaining 10% of the land was to remain under 
British control indefinitely. While the Zionist movement accepted this solution, the 
Palestinians rejected it. Consequently, the Palestinian revolution was renewed in 1937 
(Morris, 2004).  
 
1.3. The 1948 War and Palestinian Refugees Crisis 
 
The Zionist movement continued to support the migration of the Jewish diaspora 
over the next few years, causing the Jewish population in Palestine to increase to an 
estimated 650,000 in 1947 (Pergola, 2001, p. 4). Additionally, the Zionist movement 
announced publicly for the first time ever that its goal was to establish a Jewish state in 
Palestine. This announcement was made in May of 1942, during the program of a Zionist 
conference in Baltimore. This announcement confirmed the Zionist movement’s 
intentions, and the Palestinians realized that their dream of an independent state on all of 
historic Palestine was under serious threat. 
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Before the declaration of the end of the British mandate on Palestine, specifically 
on November 29th, 1947, the General Assembly of the United Nations passed Resolution 
181 to partition Palestine into a Jewish state and an Arab state. Jerusalem and Bethlehem 
were placed under United Nations control due to the cities’ religious significance and in 
an effort to preserve equal access to Holy sites. It is of significance to mention that in 
1947, the Jewish population in Palestine were estimated to be approximately 32%, while 
the Christian population represented 7%, and the remaining 61% of the population were 
Palestinian-Arabs of Muslim faith. Despite the Jewish population being almost half of 
that of the Arab counterpart, the proposed Jewish state was granted 56% of the area of 
Palestine to accommodate the anticipated migration of Jewish people from across the 
globe, while the proposed Arab state would be established on 43% of the disputed land. 
While the Jews welcomed the decision, the Palestinian-Arabs declared their rejection, yet 
again, escalating the conflict in the region (Morris, 2004; A/RES/181(II), 1947). 
 
In 1948, British troops began to withdraw from the Palestinian territories and 
evacuate their positions, which were quickly claimed by the well-equipped and organized 
Zionist militias. This resulted in them having an upper hand in the consequent fighting 
with the Palestinians over territories in Palestine, ending with the declaration of 
establishment of the State of Israel in the Palestinian territories on May 15, 1948. The 
history of the State of Israel began with the 1948 war, known as the Nakba (catastrophe, a 
common term in Arabic used by Palestinians to refer to the series of events that followed 
the 1948 war).  
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Hundreds of thousands of Palestinians have been displaced as a result of the 1948 
war. Before fleeing their homes, the Palestinians were persecuted, intimidated and 
massacred by the Israeli army in 1947 and 1948, displacing people into different 
neighboring geographical areas. In this war, the losses were great for the Palestinian and 
Israeli sides. Official Palestinian statistics are estimated at 15,000 killed, while the 
number of deaths in other Arab armies ranges between 3700 and 7000. As for the number 
of Israelis that were killed, it is estimated at 6,000 or 1% of the Israeli population in 1948 
(Aljazeera News Media, War of 1948, n.d.; Plen, n.d.).  
 
As a result of the 1948 war, the majority of Palestinians living in Palestine were 
displaced. Some refugees migrated to the nearby West Bank, which was under the control 
of the Jordanian army. Other Palestinians from the southern parts of Palestine and the 
surrounding villages migrated to the Gaza Strip, while the remaining Palestinians 
migrated to geographically neighboring countries such as Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and 
Egypt. Ever since, there have been several wars between the Arab states and Israel, and 
the Palestinian-Israeli conflict remains an issue that still awaits a solution to this day. 
While wars are clearly catastrophic and have very severe consequences, the resulting 
losses are undoubtedly the most serious. The losses are not only in terms of the number 
of dead or wounded, but also of refugees and displaced persons deprived of the right to 
return to their homes (American Friends Service Committee, n.d.; Beinin, 2014).  
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1.4. Establishment of the UNRWA 
 
Following the 1948 war, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for 
Palestine (UNRWA) was established by resolution 302 (IV) of the United Nations 
General Assembly on 8 December 1949, with the aim of providing direct relief and 
employment assistance to Palestine refugees (A/RES/194 (III), 1948). Additionally, the 
United Nations General Assembly affirmed the right of return for the Palestinian 
refugees, or compensation for those who choose to not return as indicated in resolution 
194, 
 
“[Palestinian] Refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with 
their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and 
that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return 
and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law 
or equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible.” 
(A/RES/194 (III), 1948) 
 
The UNRWA began operations on May 1, 1950 and was intended to support 
relief efforts benefiting the estimated 750,000 Palestinian refugees recognized by the 
international community in Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. 
According to UNRWA, approximately 5 million Palestinians today are eligible for aid 
and fit the refugee definition as set by the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and the 1951 Convention relating to the status of 
refugees and its 1967 protocol: 
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“A refugee is someone who has been forced to flee his or her country because of 
persecution, war, or violence. A refugee has a well-founded fear of persecution 
for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership in a 
particular social group.” (UNGA, 1951; Members' Research Service, 2015) 
 
 
1.5. The 1967 War 	
In November 1956, Israel participated in a tripartite aggression involving Britain 
and France against Egypt following the decision of President Gamal Abdel Nasser to 
nationalize the Suez Canal. Israel’s interest was to secure the Straits of Tiran passage for 
its ships that had been closed due to tensions between Egypt and Israel since 1948. 
Consequently, Israel occupied the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula, but withdrew from 
it in March 1957 due to locals’ resistance, international pressure and UN resolutions. 
Israel received assurance that the Straits of Tiran would remain open for passage of 
Israeli ships. On 5 June 1967, Egypt declared that it would deny Israeli ships passage 
through the Straits of Tiran and began mobilizing its army near the borders with Israel. 
Israel viewed the move as a declaration of aggression, and war erupted between Israel 
and three Arab states; Egypt, Jordan and Palestine in what became known as the Six Days 
War (Johnson, 2017). As a result of this aggression, Israel seized all of the Palestinian 
territories after it occupied Gaza Strip and the West Bank as well as the Egyptian Sinai 
Peninsula and the Syrian Golan Heights. The 1967 Six Days War caused further 
displacement of Palestinians in what they referred to in Arabic as Naksa (which translates 
to ‘setback’ in Arabic). An estimated additional 250,000 to 350,000 Palestinians were 
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displaced as a result of the 1967 war, some of whom had already been living in refugee 
camps in Gaza Strip or the West Bank since 1948. As per UNRWA’s historic timeline, 
approximately 10 new refugee camps were established to absorb the new wave of 
refugees following the 1967 war (UNRWA Palestine Refugees, 2018; McDowall, 1989). 
  
The Palestinian refugee crisis is considered one of the oldest, largest, and most 
complicated refugee issues in the world. The number of Palestinians assessed by the 
Palestinian Authority in 2010 is estimated at 10.9 million with 7.5 million refugees, 
representing 70% of the Palestinian population. The vast majority of these refugees are 
not allowed to return to their pre-1948 or pre-1967 hometowns. Resettlement and 
integration were not completely realized. Therefore, the right of return, to Palestinian 
refugees, is one of the most important issues to be resolved in permanent status 
agreements and peace negotiations between Israel and Palestine. For 70 years, the 
Palestinian and Israeli sides have been trying to reach a solution to the predicament of 
Palestinian refugees who were displaced in 1948, and again after the 6 Days War in 1967, 
with no tangible success.  
 
1.6. What is the Right of Return? 
 
The right of return for Palestinian refugees grants for every Palestinian refugee, and 
their descendants, to return to their homes and lands, which they left for any reason 
during the 1948 war.  The right of return guarantees Palestinian refugees the right to 
return to the lands of 1948 and 1967 or the right to compensation for the suffering of their 
emigration from their homeland.  The phrase "right of return" appeared after the 1948 
war, after a series of massacres committed allegedly by the Israeli army against dozens of 
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Palestinian villages and cities, which resulted in the displacement of nearly 800,000 
Palestinians. It is important to highlight that the right of return also applies to the 
descendants of any Palestinian who left their homes and lands in 1948 (Zilbershats, 2011; 
El-Sa’edi, 2018; Sayej, 2018). International Human Rights Law affirmed this right, and 
the United Nations General Assembly passed resolution 194, considered the first 
resolution on the Palestine refugee issue. Resolution 194,  
 
“Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with 
their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and 
that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return 
and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law 
or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities 
responsible… The Conciliation Commission to facilitate the repatriation, re-
settlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment 
of compensation, and to maintain close relations with the Director of the United 
Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees and, through him, with the appropriate 
organs and agencies of the United Nations.” (A/RES/194 (III), 1948)  
 
Although some argue that the definition of right of return put forth by the United 
Nations in 1948 is outdated and no longer viable (i.e. Palestinian refugees returning to the 
State of Israel given that their homes and villages no longer exist), this definition for the 
right of return remains to be the ultimate guide and reference for Palestinians. However, 
years of no solution for Palestinian refugees issue could dictate the necessity to make 
iterations to what the right of return practically means nowadays, 70 years after 
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Palestinians migrated from their villages in 1948. For instance, financial compensation 
and/or a symbolic "return" to a new Palestinian state constructed from the Occupied 
Territories could potentially replace the classical right of return definition, contingent on 
the agreement by both Palestinians and Israelis. However, the historic definition of the 
right of return for Palestinian refugees to their pre-1948 villages will be used throughout 
the thesis, given that is what was set forth and currently accepted by the international 
community.  
 
1.7. Which Palestinian Refugees are Included in the Right of Return? 
UNRWA defines the Palestinian refugees as “The persons whose normal place of 
residence was Palestine during the period 1 June 1946 to 15 May 1948, and who lost 
both home and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 conflict.” (UNRWA Palestine 
Refugees, 2018) 
Palestinians were displaced to various areas during the 1948 war. The number of 
Palestinians who left their homeland in 1948 was estimated at nearly 800,000 who 
emigrated to the West Bank, Gaza Strip, or to neighboring Arab countries such as 
Lebanon, Jordan and Syria. Nowadays, the number of Palestinian refugees has increased 
by roughly 10 fold since 1948, due to the fact that descendants of Palestinian refugees are 
also included in the UNRWA definition of Palestine refugees. According to UNRWA 
records, the agency began by responding to the needs of nearly 750,000 Palestinian 
refugees. Today, almost 5 million Palestinian refugees are eligible for UNRWA's 
services. The majority of current Palestinian refugees numbers are distributed as follows: 
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• Gaza Strip has approximately 1.3 million Palestinians who are UNRWA-
registered refugees and are distributed across 8 different refugee camps. 
 
• West Bank has over 800,000 Palestinians who are registered with 
UNRWA and are distributed across 19 different refugees camps. 
 
• Israel has approximately 335,204 Palestinian refugees who were 
internally displaced into areas that fall within Israel’s borders. 
 
• Egypt has approximately 50,000 Palestinian refugees.  
 
• Jordan has the largest proportion of Palestinian refugees outside of 
Palestine, estimated at nearly two million. They live a decent life 
compared to other refugees elsewhere, since Jordan granted Palestinian 
refugees full citizenship rights. 
 
• Lebanon has approximately 450,000 Palestinian refugees who are 
registered with UNRWA, and around 3,000 Palestinians in Lebanon who 
are not registered and have no other form of official identity or formal 
documents. The refugees of Lebanon are considered to have the worst 
living conditions relative to Palestine refugees in other territories. They 
are often deprived of basic educational, health and professional rights.  
 
• Syria has around 526,000 Palestinian refugees who are registered with 
UNRWA. The numbers reflect the population of Palestinian refugees in 
Syria prior to the eruption of the ongoing civil war since 2011. It is 
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estimated that many of those refugees have been forced to leave the 
country along with many Syrians due to the brutality of the war. 
 
• Iraq has approximately 11,544 UNHCR-registered Palestinian refugees 
 
(Palestine Refugees: Locations and Numbers, 2010)  
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2. Literature Review 
 
The issue of Palestinian refugees remains at the core of the Arab-Israeli conflict, 
which continues to this day. Over the decades, there has been a great deal of negotiations 
between the Israelis and the Palestinians to find a mutually acceptable solution to the 
question of the return of refugees. Most of these negotiations have been in the form of 
meetings and summits seeking to resolve the situation of Palestinian refugees. 
 
The Declaration of Principles for Peace Negotiations that took place in Oslo, 1993, is 
considered to be the most significant milestone of all peace negotiations thus far. The 
Palestinian position during the negotiations has been firm on the commitment to the right 
of the Palestinian refugees to return to their cities and the right to a fair compensation for 
all their losses. The Palestinian negotiation team’s stance on the right of return for 
refugees relies heavily on the United Nations Resolution 194 of 11 December 1948, 
which provides for the establishment of a United Nations conciliation commission, the 
determination of the status of Jerusalem in a permanent international order, and the 
determination of the right of refugees to return to their homes in accordance with the 
provisions of international law.   
 
In spite of several attempts to achieve consensus among the conflicting parties on a 
solution for the issue of Palestinian refugees, all commissions and interventions from the 
international community has failed. This led to an agreement during the Oslo Accord 
discussions that the topic of refugees, along with other topics of conflict such as 
Jerusalem and borders, is postponed to permanent status negotiations intended to take 
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place no later than the year 2000. By the time the deadline approached, a new wave of 
violence erupted, and the peace process began to deteriorate until it reached a complete 
stop since 2013.  
 
In order to further dissect and understand some of the root causes for a lack of 
solutions on the Palestinian refugees issue, one must take a step back and investigate the 
two different perspectives, the Israeli and the Palestinian, in terms of the origins and the 
narratives of how this refugee problem came to exist.    
 
2.1. Narratives of the Palestinian Refugee Crisis                          
 
Expectedly, there are two completely different, and often contradictory, versions 
of the origins of the Palestinian refugees’ problem, commonly viewed as a product of the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. On one hand, there are Israeli narratives that dominate the 
ideas of Israeli society. On the other hand, different narratives dictate what Palestinians 
believe. Using the words of Marwan Hanania on his review of Robert Rotberg’s book 
titled ‘Israeli And Palestinian Narratives of Conflict: History's Double Helix’, “[Israelis 
and Palestinians] view similar events from different angles” (Hanania, 2009; Rotberg, 
2006, p. 2). Rotberg further illustrates that the Palestinian and Israeli sides recount the 
events of 1948 in a way that serves the interests of each side. He interviewed Dan Bar-
On, an Israeli psychology professor, and Sami Adwan, a Palestinian education professor, 
where they both agreed that “The Israeli and Palestinian narratives are intertwined like a 
double helix, but they are still separate and should be acknowledged as such” (Rotberg, 
2006, p. 205). 
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2.1.1. Israeli Narratives 
The Israeli narrative on the Palestinian refugee crisis is that the refugee issue is a 
completely made up problem. The mainstream Israeli narrative is that in 1948 the Arab 
states were the ones who asked the Palestinians to leave their homes, in order to allow the 
Arab armies to advance and fight the Jewish minorities, without causing any casualties on 
the Palestinian side. It further goes to describe that the Arab inhabitants of Palestine at 
that time (1947-1948) were the ones who launched the attack on the Jews, whose 
responses were of limited defensive nature to only fight back terrorist aggressors. The 
Israeli narrative also claims that the Arabs had fled Palestine for fear of retaliation from 
the Jewish population, since the Palestinian-Arabs were committing many crimes against 
the Jewish minority, and that the Arabs knew it was only a matter of time before the 
Jewish forces took revenge (Morris, 2004; Collins, 1972; Eyal, 2016; Katz, 1973; 
Kurzman, 1992, Syrkin, 1971). Additionally, the Israeli narrative suggests that the 
Palestinians who migrated,  
“Were not emigrating but merely moving eastward within the boundaries of 
Greater Palestine which stretched far to the eastern side of the Jordan River where they 
would encounter the same climate, language, religion and ethnic community that they 
had left behind” (Eyal, 2016).  
 
Lastly, the Israeli narrative also questions the Palestinian refugee numbers in 
discussion. Israeli historians often reference the report put together by Hagana’s 
intelligence service, which describes the Palestinian refugee numbers as of June 1948 at 
approximately 391,000. This number represents half of the number of Palestinian 
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refugees estimated by the Arab states and acknowledged by the United Nations during 
the same period after the 1948 war.  
 
2.1.2. Palestinian Narratives 
The Palestinian narrative claims that Arab inhabitants of the region were forced to 
emigrate as a result of the panic caused by the ongoing fighting and the multiple attacks 
on Palestinian civilians by Jewish militia forces such as Haganah, Irgun and Histadrut. 
Palestinian historians also indicate that news and rumors that spread about horrific acts of 
terrorism, murder and expulsion against Arabs further fueled this migration, causing 
some Palestinian villagers to flee even before the Israeli forces arrived in fear for their 
lives (Amirav, 2009; Anderson, 1983; Arieli, 2009; Morris, 2004; Eyal, 2016; Khalidi, 
1998; Peretz, 1958)  
 
The Palestinian narrative also suggests that Israel has worked in every way to 
push as many Arab inhabitants as possible to flee their lands, homes and farms. The Deir 
Yassin Massacre, where Palestinian women, children, men and the elderly were allegedly 
indiscriminately killed, served the main purpose to instill fear and terror in the hearts of 
the Palestinians in the region. There are no exact numbers for the death toll, but it is 
estimated that around 200 Palestinians were killed from the village of Deir Yassin, about 
half the residents, while the remaining were relocated further east (Kanaana, 1987, p. 55). 
The Deir Yassin Massacre succeeded in forcing many reluctant-to-leave Palestinians to 
flee their homes from the horrors that awaited them.  
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Describing the Palestinian viewpoint on the events that led to their fear and consequent 
migration, Eyal Lewin, the Chair of Department of Multidisciplinary Studies at Ariel 
University in Israel, wrote:  
 
“Most of the Palestinian refugees were forced out of the country as a result of 
an Israeli ethnic cleansing program that aimed to create geographic continuity and 
a Jewish majority throughout Palestine. The attacks on Arab villages all over the 
country entailed the destruction of the Palestinian community and the expulsion 
of the bulk of the Palestinian Arabs.” (Eyal, 2016, p. 20) 
 
Eyal further describes that the ethnic cleansing against Palestinians that was carried out 
by the Israeli forces came under the umbrella of a military executive order known as Plan 
Dalet, or Plan D, which was implemented during the 1948 war. Eyal describes:  
 
“Some of the clauses of Plan D are apparent within orders given to the forces by 
the Israeli leadership of the time, mainly Ben Gurion and Moshe Dayan: The […] 
Destruction of villages (setting fire, blowing up, and planting mines in the debris), 
especially in those population centers which are difficult to control continuously. 
[…] the encirclement of the village and conducting a search inside it. In the event 
of resistance the armed force must be wiped out and the population must be 
expelled outside the borders of the state.” (Eyal, 2016, p. 21; Gilad, 1957, p. 286) 
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The Palestinian narrative also claims that the Zionist movement had pre-determined 
plans before the 1948 war to expel the Palestinians and displace them to the territories of 
the future Arab state in Palestine that is yet to be formed, or to other neighboring Arab 
countries. These plans, which eventually came true under the pretext of ending the 
escalating conflict between the Arab and Jewish parties, ensured the establishment of a 
Jewish-dominant state with an Arab minority. However, an Arab state in Palestine was 
never established in the territory, but rather further occupied in 1967 (Morris, 2004).   
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3. Denial of the Right of Return 
 
The Israeli government’s position on Palestinian refugees has not changed since 
1948; the Israeli government does not recognize the right of Palestinian refugees to 
return. Israeli officials continue to say that Palestinian refugees, and their descendants, 
cannot be allowed to return to the homes and communities from which they have been 
displaced. The Israeli historic rationale has been fixated on the fact that return would 
pose a threat to maintaining a Jewish demographic majority in Israel. Joseph Weitz, the 
head of the Jewish Agency’s Colonization Department in 1940 said,  
 
“Between ourselves it must be clear that there is no room for both peoples 
together in this country. We shall not achieve our goal if the Arabs are in this 
small country. There is no other way than to transfer the Arabs from here to 
neighboring countries – all of them. Not one village, not one tribe should be left.”  
(Weitz, 1965, p.293) 
 
This position is supported by an absolute majority of Israeli citizens from all over the 
political spectrum, because the return of such large numbers of Palestinian refugees to the 
State of Israel will have far-reaching consequences for the nature of the state. These 
arguments however are based mostly on the fear of changing the identity of the Israeli 
State.  
 
For instance, when then prime minister Ehud Barak during the Camp David summit 
of 2000 had expressed that Israel sympathizes with the struggle of the Palestinian 
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refugees and what has happened to them following the 1948 war, and hinted that the State 
of Israel may be open to limited repatriation of Palestinian refugees and/or contributing 
funds to an international organization that could help with rehabilitation of Palestinian 
refugees at their host countries, public surveys conducted in Israel the very following 
month in August 2000 showed that over 75% of Israelis rejected the proposed return of 
Palestinians into Israel. In fact, the same survey showed that the Israeli public would 
rather give up sovereignty over Jerusalem than allow for Palestinian refugees to return 
into Israel (Shuval, 2002; Tovy, 2003; Eyal, 2016). 
 
However, a new poll on the return of Palestinian refugees, conducted by 
Geocartography Knowledge Group, a leading research institute in Israel, reveals 
differences in opinions regarding the right of return within the Israeli society based on 
age, ethnicity and income. The survey involved 500 Israeli Jews from different 
backgrounds. The study concluded that one out of every four Jewish Israelis supports the 
right of return of Palestinian refugees (25%). Israelis aged 18 to 34 support the right of 
return at a particularly high rate (25.9%) compared with adults over the age of 55 
(15.1%) and between 35 and 54 (7.3%). Secular Jews supported the right of return four 
times higher than Jewish religious Jews (22.3% versus 5.2%, respectively). Additionally, 
Israelis demonstrated differences in opinions based on whether they are second-
generation Israelis, Israelis whose parents were born in Europe, or Israelis whose parents 
are of Mizrahi origin. Second-generation Israelis supported the right of return at a much 
higher rate (22.6%) compared to those born to European immigrants (14.1%), and those 
born to Mizrahi parents also referred to as Easterners, (11.7%). Also, the study concluded 
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that Israelis with middle incomes are likely to support the right of return twice more than 
those who earn above average income (21.9% versus 12.7%) (Middle East Monitor, 
2018). 
 
3.1. Argument #1: Israel is a Nation for Jews 
 
One of the most important concerns of the Israeli people is to preserve the Jewish 
national identity. During the last two decades of the 19th century, Theodore Herzl, the 
Hungarian Jewish journalist, was considered the spiritual father and founder of World 
Zionism as a colonial political movement that gave Jews the status of nationality. In 
1896, Herzl published his book ‘The Jewish State’ explaining that the idea of this state is 
not new, but "a very old one: it is the restoration of the Jewish State" (Herzl, 1896, p.1; 
The Jewish Virtual Library, Texts Concerning Zionism: Excerpts from “The Jewish 
State”, para. 2). 
 
Herzl intended to give the Jewish state project a historical dimension in order to justify 
the restoration of this state as a "historical right" for the Jews. Since the state is 
synonymous with nationalism, the nationality of the Jews "cannot be destroyed and will 
not be destroyed and must not be destroyed" (Herzl, 1896). 
 
It has been also suggested that Herzl worked on linking three main points to the 
establishment of the Jewish state; first, the social dimension through the alignment and 
galvanization with Jews from the lower classes of the European social ladder. The second 
being the religious dimension in an attempt to evoke the phrase "promised land" and "the 
chosen people of God" and to show that the restoration of the revival of the Jewish state 
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is a divine matter from God. Third, the national dimension in which the Jews, despite 
their distribution in the diaspora, are one people and represent a unified nation.  
 
"I think that the Jewish question is no longer just a social problem, it is a religious 
issue, but it may take other forms" Herzl said in his book ‘The Jewish State’. He added 
that "A national issue that can only be solved when it is treated as a global political issue 
that must be discussed by the peoples of the world. Civilized in an international council." 
(Herzl, 1896, p. 1, 6 and 9; EL-Soud, 2017; Mourad, 2011) 
 
3.2. Argument #2: The Return of Palestinian Refugees Will Distort the Jewish 
Identity of the State of Israel 
 
After examining the original concept of Zionism and re-establishing the Jewish 
state first envisioned by Herzl, it becomes clear that, from the Israeli government’s point 
of view, the Palestinian demand for the right of return for refugees is a red line. 
Additionally, the return of any significant number of Palestinian refugees to Israel could 
obliterate the Jewish identity of the state, which is in direct opposition to the very 
fundamental basis for rebuilding a Jewish state. In an article in the Maariv Newspaper, 
writer Amos Gilboa, a strategic Israeli researcher and political analyst, said that the right 
of return for the Palestinians clearly meant the end of the Zionist state. In the same 
context, journalist Nawaf El-Zarrou listed several proposals by key Israeli figures since 
the middle of the twentieth century attempting to eliminate the issue of the Palestinian 
refugees’ right of return. Zarrou writes that the second Prime Minister in Israel’s history, 
who later became Minister of Foreign Affairs, Moshe Sharett called for giving up the 
Palestinians' right to return as a condition for re-entering into negotiations in 1956. Nine 
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years later, Levi Eshkol, the third Prime Minister to lead an Israeli government proposed 
on May 17 1965 that Palestinian refugees must surrender their right of return, and that the 
State of Israel would in return contribute large sums of money towards the rehabilitation 
of those refugees outside of Israel. Several other proposals were renewed or reiterated by 
other prominent Israeli government leaders such as Moshe Dayan in his proposal of 1972, 
David Ben-Gurion in 1972, and Shimon Peres in 1976 (El-Zarrou, 2008).  
 
The demographic factor has been historically the most decisive factor in 
determining the victory of one of the two parties, Israeli or Palestinian, to the conflict 
over the land between the Jordan River in the East and the Mediterranean Sea on the 
West. The demographic factor is also one of the most important forms of geopolitical 
conflict between the Israeli and Palestinian sides. Israel fully recognizes the importance 
of this factor in order to preserve the identity of the Jewish state, and therefore the right 
of return is outright rejected. Israel is fully aware that the Palestinian fertility rate is high 
for social, cultural and religious reasons compared to Jewish citizens in Israel. Israel 
recognizes that fertility and population growth rates for the Palestinians will change state 
demographics in favor of a Palestinian-dominant society. If Palestinian refugees are 
allowed to return to their historic hometowns in Israel, in a matter of few decades 
Palestinians will become the majority and will sweep the State of Israel and its plan to 
maintain its Jewish identity. Table 1 illustrates that Palestinians, inside Israel or within 
Palestinian Territories, have almost double the fertility rate and overall population growth 
rate compared to Jewish counterparts in Israel.  
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Table 1. Demographics of the Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab two major 
populations in Israel and Palestine. Statistics shown are not reflective of Jewish 
and Palestinian diaspora around the world (Palestinian Central Bureau of 
Statistics; Mourad, 2011). 
 
Population 
Demographics in the region 
between the Jordan River and the 
Mediterranean Sea Growth Rate 
Fertility Rate 
(Child per woman) 
Year Number (millions) % 
Israelis 
(Jewish) 
1997 4,701,600 55.5 
1.8 % 2.6 
2007 5,478,200 52.5 
Palestinians 
1997 3,765,700 44.5 
3.3 % 4.2 
2007 4,947,226 47.5 
 
 
Therefore, it can be said that not only the Israeli government, but also Israelis 
from all shades of the political spectrum, often are in favor of rejecting the 
implementation of the right of return under UN Resolution 194, which calls for the return 
of Palestinians to their homes; on the pretext that such a solution constitutes a threat to 
the identity of the State of Israel and changes its character as a Jewish state due to the 
demographic imbalance that will result from the application of the right of return of 
Palestinian refugees. 
 
 
3.2.1. Future-Proofing the State of Israel by Passing The Jewish National 
Law 
On July 19, 2018, the Israeli Knesset (parliament) passed a law that declares the 
country as the ‘Nation-State for Jewish People Alone,’ also known as the Jewish National 
Law. The law was proposed by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his government, 
which has been described as the most right-wing and religious coalition in Israel’s history 
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(Halbfinger, 2018). Although the split in the number of votes reflect a great divide within 
Israel’s legislative body for varying reasons, the law was passed with 62 votes for, 55 
votes against and two abstentions. This newly passed Jewish National Law stipulates that 
1) the State of Israel is the national homeland of the Jewish people, 2) the Greater and 
Unified Jerusalem is the capital of Israel forever, 3) the right of self-determination in the 
State of Israel is limited to the Jews, and 4) the Hebrew language is the official language 
of the State and the Arabic language has lost its status as an official language. Many 
critics of the new law, including Jewish faith leaders, non-Jewish minorities in Israel, and 
expectedly Palestinians, claim that this is basically an apartheid law that disregards any 
other ethnic or religious group in the State of Israel. The law also declares that the Israeli 
government will do all it can to encourage Jewish settlement everywhere in the land of 
Israel, including the West Bank territory, which belongs to the Palestinian Authority as 
outlined in the Oslo Accords. 
 
The Palestinians say that there is no doubt that the Jewish National law is based 
on discrimination between Jews and Arabs on an ethnic and religious basis. The law 
affirms that only Jews have the right to decide the fate of the State of Israel, meaning that 
the Israeli-Arabs who are citizens of Israel, and living within Israeli government 
sovereignty, have no right to decide their fate. On the other hand, the Arab population, 
representing approximately 21% of Israel’s population, in addition to other minorities are 
excluded; which can cause discrimination to become justified and legitimate, according 
to which Palestinians become strangers in their homeland. Many experts view the act as a 
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codification and extension of racist colonial legacy, based on ethnic cleansing and the 
abolition of the other (Bard 2018; Halbfinger, 2018). 
 
The Jewish National law is also viewed as one of the most dangerous laws 
recently enacted by Israel. The law came with a set of clauses that emphasized the racial 
superiority of Jews as individuals and as people in all aspects. Where Israel identifies 
itself as a Jewish and democratic state, some argue that this law has come to negate any 
manifestation of democracy and resolves what is described as tension between the Jewish 
character and the democratic character of the state. The new law has no mention of 
democracy and equality, which is concerning as it could be viewed that the State of 
Israel, by definition under the new law, becomes a non-democratic Jewish state. This 
offers an explanation to the strong reactions and protests that have been recorded in Israel 
after the enactment of the law, not only by the Palestinian minority in Israel, but also 
from Israeli Jews who view the new law as harmful to the state of Israel, and from other 
ethnic and religious minority groups such as Druze, Syriac Christians, Armenians, 
Assyrians and others.  
 
Passing of the Jewish National Law has led the European Union to publicly 
announce their unease with this development. Federica Mogherini, the spokeswoman for 
EU foreign affairs commented on the new law passed by Israel saying that,  
“We are concerned, we have expressed this concern and we will continue to 
engage with Israeli authorities in this context”. She further added “[EU has] been 
very clear when it comes to the two-state solution, we believe it is the only way 
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forward and any step that would further complicate or prevent this solution of 
becoming a reality should be avoided.” (Haaretz, 2018)   
 
The issue of Israel as a Jewish state has become increasingly important in recent 
years and a major point of contention between Israelis and Palestinians. For years now, 
Israeli governments have relentlessly demanded that the Palestinian Authority recognize 
Israel as a Jewish state, but the Palestinians continue refusing to do so. Thus, Israel 
enacted the National Jewish Law, which aims to protect Israel's status as a national state 
of the Jewish people, in order to consolidate the values of the State of Israel in the law of 
nationalism as a Jewish and democratic state, and after it realized that the Palestinian 
counterpart does not seem to be caving in. Israel was also quick to enact the law because 
of continued concern about the high birth rate among Israeli Arabs. This step is also 
viewed as future-proofing the state of Israel in case a two-state solution to the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict is no longer viable and the alternative one-state solution becomes 
viewed as the only option, which could threaten the Jewish majority in Israel. 
Additionally, the law in Israel has a very symbolic significance, and for the Arab 
minority in Israel it represents an evidence of the marginalization of their status  
(Aljazeera, Israel passes controversial 'Jewish nation-state' law, 2018; Haaretz, 2018).  
 
In either case, the Jewish National Law has severe ramifications on the 
Palestinian refugees issue. On one hand, the current Israeli government has declared on 
multiple occasions that the two-state solution is no longer obligatory. In fact, observers of 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict admit that over the past few years, Israel has been actively 
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working on the ground to reduce the chances for success of the two-state solution. In this 
case, the Israeli government is using the Jewish National Law as a safety net in case a 
large-scale influx of Palestinian populations were to happen, most likely from the West 
Bank, by establishing a pre-existing status quo where only Jewish citizens have the right 
to self-determination and certain civic privileges. On the other hand, the Israeli 
government could be future-proofing the State of Israel from any potential drastic shifts 
in demographics in case Palestinian refugees were given repatriation or in case Israel 
decided to formally annex parts of the West Bank and consequently having to absorb 
some Palestinians into Israel. 
 
 
Finally, experts opposing the passing of the law say the Jewish National Law has 
several other disadvantages, and risks violations of human rights by giving exclusive 
support and civic privileges to Jewish citizens only. Some of those risks are: 
 
1. The Jewish National Law repeals all UN resolutions that affirmed the right 
of return and compensation, including UN General Assembly Resolution 
194 of 11 December 1948. It also repeals all the agreements, such as the 
Oslo Accords. 
 
2. National law helps to open the door to another displacement of 
Palestinians who live inside Israel and make up about a quarter of Israel's 
population and hold an Israeli citizenship. 
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3. The Jewish National Law is a document of a legal nature that is binding in 
the courts and the judiciary system if it conflicts with the provisions of 
other Israeli law. For example, the Jewish National Law encourages 
building Jewish settlements in Israel and the West Bank, which means that 
there is no longer a need to circumvent the Palestinian land and sources 
under the pretext of their development. Instead, Palestinian lands could be 
confiscated publicly as long as they are used to build Jewish settlements.  
 
4. National law will also help open the door to the implementation of the 
settlement legitimization law, which is currently awaiting a resolution 
from the Israeli Supreme Court. It will pave the way for rejecting any 
proposal on the right of return while facilitating and encouraging Jewish 
immigration. 
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4. Effects of U.S. Policy on the Palestinian Refugee Issue 
4.1. U.S. Support of Israel Policies  	
In 1887, the first Zionist lobby in the United States was founded with the aim of 
establishing a Jewish state somewhere in the world. However, the United States did not 
become increasingly interested in the Middle East until after World War II. At that stage, 
the U.S. government has used all its resources to obtain international support for the idea 
of establishing a Jewish state in Palestine and recognizing it as a member of the United 
Nations in order to normalize relations with all neighboring Arab states. The United 
States adopted a strategy of filling the vacuum resulting from the fall of Britain and 
France. There were many factors that have drawn the attention of the United States to the 
importance of this region and the importance of its extensive presence. These include the 
search for proxies in the region to secure its oil interests, reduce Russian influence in the 
region and ensure Israel's security. Furthermore, there are several more reasons that 
continue to draw the formal U.S. support of Israel today on all fronts. Stephen Zunes, 
professor of Politics and former coordinator of Middle Eastern Studies at the University 
of San Francisco, discussed the topic extensively and illustrated that Israel’s military and 
intelligence agencies have successfully prevented radical movements in the region from 
expanding. He also adds that the Israeli military forces and agencies represent a proxy for 
the U.S. in the Middle East, and therefore, it is in the best interest for the U.S. to support 
Israel, even when Israel’s actions may be in violation with human rights. Zunes writes on 
the topic of why the U.S. supports Israel: 
 
“Through a mixture of guilt regarding Western anti-Semitism, personal 
friendships with Jewish Americans who identify strongly with Israel, and fear of 
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inadvertently encouraging anti-Semitism by criticizing Israel, there is enormous 
reluctance to acknowledge the seriousness of Israeli violations of human rights 
and international law.” (Zunes 2002, p. 1) 
 
Zunes also adds that on top of the $3 billion a year that Israel receives in U.S. aid through 
foreign military funding, there is also a theological foundation in the evangelical 
Christian right that gives steam to the limitless support that Israel receives from the U.S., 
 
“[U.S. support of Israel is] Based in part on a messianic theology that sees the 
ingathering of Jews to the Holy Land as a precursor for the second coming of 
Christ, the battle between Israelis and Palestinians is, in their eyes, simply a 
continuation of the battle between the Israelites and the Philistines, with God in 
the role of a cosmic real estate agent who has deemed that the land belongs to 
Israel alone secular notions regarding international law and the right of self-
determination notwithstanding.” (Zunes, 2002, p. 1) 
 
Additionally, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) representing an 
alliance of Jewish Americans and friends of Israel in the United States emerged as a 
major political influence on the decisions made by Congress and across the country, more 
sharply under President Reagan who was viewed as the most pro-Israel U.S. president in 
history (Thabet, 2016). 
 
Despite the occasional tensions and problems experienced by U.S.-Israeli 
relations, it has flourished and its success has become indispensable. The U.S. has not 
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stopped providing financial, economic, diplomatic, and military aid since the 
establishment of Israel in 1948 (Beauchamp, 2018). The U.S. policy supporting Israel has 
not changed since President Eisenhower, including President Trump’s administration 
today. Therefore, it is difficult to find serious differences among the ten American 
presidents over the past 50 years on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict question, as Israel has 
been the cornerstone of U.S. policy in the region. The neutrality of the United States 
towards Israel, ignoring its practices and occupation of the Palestinians, is the general 
nature of U.S. policy (Weir, 2014; Zunes, 2002). 
 
4.1.1. The Trump Administration and Palestinian Refugee Issues 
President Trump's administration is the first in history to support Israel 
completely and without reservation, even on issues that previous U.S. presidents 
remained neutral on for the past few decades to prevent being viewed as biased in favor 
of Israel. For instance, one of the biggest controversial decisions made by President 
Trump regarding the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is the declaration of Jerusalem as the 
capital of Israel and the transfer of the U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. 
Additionally, President Trump has publicly mentioned that he does not view the two-state 
solution as the only viable solution to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Such 
decisions and others taken by the Trump administration are welcomed by Israelis, but 
viewed by Palestinians as further complicating the ongoing struggle. 
 
Although the main focus of this work is to examine the Israeli governments’ stand 
on the right of return for Palestinian refugees, it is critical to point out that the recent 
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limitless support of President Trump’s administration would only cause a further 
hardening of the Israeli government’s stance on the Palestinian refugees issue, and the 
overall peace process. For instance, President Trump recently made a number of 
decisions against the Palestinians that may directly cause harm to the Palestinian right of 
return.  
 
4.1.1.1. Cutting Aid to the UNRWA 
 
The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near 
East (UNRWA) was established by a resolution of the United Nations General Assembly 
in 1949 to provide assistance and protection to some 5 million Palestinian refugees in 
various areas including Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. On 
January 16, 2018, Washington D.C. reduced its assistance to the UNRWA, freezing some 
$300 million of its $365 million annual assistance to the agency. This move caused the 
UNRWA to take several decisions that led to the reduction of critical services in the 
Palestinian refugee camps. Additionally, months after the initial decision to reduce aid, 
the U.S. administration decided on August 3, 2018 to cut all of its remaining financial aid 
to UNRWA. Simply, President Trump’s administration has decided to stop any further 
contributions to UNRWA. The Palestinians considered the decision a dangerous 
escalation against the Palestinians aimed at adopting the Israeli government’s stand of 
denying the right of return and eliminating the Palestinian refugee issue once and for all, 
by defunding and dismantling the international agency that supports Palestine refugees. 
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4.1.1.2. Cutting Aid to the Palestinian Authority 
 
On August 2, 2018, Palestinian Prime Minister Rami al-Hamdallah told a news 
conference in the West Bank city of Ramallah that the U.S. administration had decided to 
stop all aid to the Palestinian Authority. The White House issued a statement saying that 
Washington had redirected more than $200 million annually allocated for economic aid 
to the West Bank and Gaza to projects elsewhere in the world. 
 
4.1.1.3. Closing the Palestinian Liberation Organization Office in 
Washington 
 
Saeb Erekat, a member of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO), announced on September 10, 2018 that the U.S. administration 
officially informed them of its decision to close the PLO office in Washington "We have 
been officially informed that the US administration will close our embassy in Washington 
D.C. as punishment for continuing to work with the International Criminal Court against 
Israeli war crimes and will take down the flag of Palestine in Washington, D.C.," Erekat 
said in a statement published by the Palestinian news agency WAFA. (Aljazeera, 
“Trump’s Seven Resolutions that Directly Impact the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict”, 2018) 
 
Given the United States global position and its strong influence in parallel with its 
ability to participate in the financing of any solution to the Palestinian refugees problem, 
the two sides, Israeli and Palestinian, view the United States as the final judge that can 
contribute positively to finding a solution for the millions of Palestinian refugees. 
Although the U.S. government has not formally supported the Israeli government’s 
position regarding denying the right of return for Palestinian refugees in the past, it has 
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ignored Israel's actions towards the Palestinians. Israel has continued construction of 
more settlements in the Palestinian territories, which slowly renders the right of return for 
Palestinians impossible, since there will be no land to return to in a future Palestinian 
State, in case an alternative solution is agreed upon by which Palestinian refugees return 
to a Palestinian State instead of returning to Israel. Many scholars on the Palestinian side 
of the aisle believe that Israel cannot do what it does to the Palestinians without the 
political, financial and military support of the United States government. The United 
States provides Israel with diplomatic cover in the international arena and at the United 
Nations, and supplies Israel with most of its weapons and military equipment. The U.S. 
has always described itself as the neutral party with regard to the Palestinian-Israeli issue, 
but this description is not typically in line with its pro-Israel policy. However, President 
Trump and his administration shifted drastically, in favor of Israel, from the previous 
U.S. administrations’ neutral position on significant topics such as Jerusalem, the two-
state solution, the right of return for refugees and the support of UNRWA. Such shifts in 
the formal position of the U.S. would only cause the most right-wing government of 
Israel’s history to be more rigid on negotiating any solutions for the Palestinian refugees 
issue.  
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5. Conclusions and Avenues for Future Work 		
It is important to point out that the right of refugees and displaced persons to return to 
their homes is a fundamental human right, an inalienable right that does not diminish 
over time. The right of return for refugees and displaced people was affirmed by the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights. Also, the right of return stems from the inviolability of private property, 
which cannot be dismissed by occupation or new sovereignties. For example, the right of 
return was applied to European Jews to recover their properties that were confiscated 
during World War II, without the need to pass a specific international resolution. 
Additionally, the right of return for Palestinian refugees has been confirmed dozens of 
times by the International community since the 1948 war, beginning with the affirmation 
by UN General Assembly Resolution 194 (Ba’ba, 2000).  
 
However, despite all the agreements and treaties that affirm the right of return for 
refugees, Israeli governments continue to reject this right for Palestinian refugees, which 
is one of the most basic rights of any displaced people. Israel stands with all its might to 
prevent the implementation of the resolution for reasons that sometimes are attributed to 
public security and maintaining a dominant Jewish demographic in the State of Israel. 
The U.S. is the only superpower that can effectively pressure Israel to implement all 
resolutions related to Palestinian refugee affairs and the right of return. However, the 
United States, through its unwavering support of Israel on all fronts, chooses not to 
interfere with enforcing the right of return for Palestinian refugees. 
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The recent rise of right-wing governments both in Israel and the U.S. does not bode 
well for the peace process between the Palestinians and Israelis, let alone the Palestinian 
refugee issue. As mentioned before, President Trump's recent series of decisions 
regarding the Palestinian-Israeli conflict disregard several international treaties and laws, 
including the Oslo treaty, that provide for the right of Palestinian refugees to return to 
their homes that were abandoned in 1948, including the Security Council and the UN 
General Assembly Resolution 194, which guaranteed the right of Palestine refugees to 
return to their homes. 
 
The Palestinian and Jewish populations have gone through many challenges since the 
beginning of the conflict in 1917. But practically speaking, the Palestinians have been the 
weakest link in the political chain, so that the Palestinians continue to bear the burden of 
the failure of the peace process. The peace process has been stalled since 2013, which has 
worsened Palestinian-Israeli relations, the lack of a solution to the issues of Jerusalem, 
refugees and settlement, and many other important issues. 
 
In order to reach a solution for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, especially the refugee 
issue, it is imperative that the peace process between the two sides must return. 
Additionally, a just and comprehensive peace in the Middle East would not prevail 
without a solution to the right of return to the largest and oldest refugee issue in the 
world. We must accept the reality, that there is an occupation and two peoples on the 
same land.  
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5.1. Two-State Solution 
There are solutions on the international scene, and these solutions are realistic and 
pragmatic, if given a chance to be implemented. One of the most viable options is the 
two-state solution, which is widely accepted and supported by the international 
community. Palestinians have been demanding for decades to be allowed to establish an 
independent state of their own within the borders set in the aftermath of the Arab-Israeli 
war of 1967. The Israeli government’s stance on the two-state solution has fluctuated 
back and fourth over the years in terms of support, or lack thereof. Most recently, the 
right-wing government currently led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has publicly 
declared that they do not support the two-state solution. Furthermore, the two-state 
solution is practically fading due to the continuous building of Israeli settlements and the 
cessation of the peace process between the Palestinians and the Israelis; this is on top of 
the presence of an Israeli right-wing government that does not accept the potential 
existence of an independent neighboring Palestinian State. In my opinion, the two-state 
solution is the ideal, and most importantly feasible, solution for the Israeli and Palestinian 
conflict. The two-state solution is the best option since the Palestinians and the Israelis 
want independence; the Israelis want a Jewish state, and the Palestinians want a 
Palestinian state (Franc24, “The Two-State Solution and Its Alternatives”, 2017; 
Beauchamp, 2018) 
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5.2. One-State Solution 
Alternatively, the one-state solution is the only other fair and feasible option to the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict. This solution would basically entail the merging of Israel and 
the Palestinian Territories into one big state (Beauchamp, 2018). The solution of one-
state also means that the Palestinians and the Israelis would have equal rights. This result 
is unacceptable to the majority of Israeli society, especially to the Zionists and 
conservative right-wing, and also less supported by the Palestinians compared to having 
their own independent state. However, given the circumstances for the Palestinian side 
and their struggle for statehood since 1948, there is an increase in the percentage of 
Palestinians who support a one-state solution, especially in view of the stalemate on a 
two-state solution (Beauchamp, 2018; Halbfinger, 2018). 
 
In my opinion, I do not think the one-state solution is a feasible one since there will 
be an apartheid system that will discriminate between the two peoples on an ethnic and 
religious basis. The double standards, laws, rights and privileges currently in effect will 
lead to more frustration and anger. The government will be mostly concerned with rights 
of the Jewish population. Additionally, the Palestinians would oppose such an 
arrangement as they anticipate being marginalized and discriminated against. Therefore, 
the one-state solution will not gain significant support in Israel or Palestine. Hence, the 
two-state solution is the most feasible option in terms of implementation, and could lead 
the Palestinians to be more prone to compromise on the refugees’ right of return to their 
homes within the State of Israel, as long as they are offered the option of returning 
instead to a Palestinian state with full sovereignty and internationally recognized borders. 
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Hence, it is in fact in Israel and the Zionist movement’s best interest to support the 
establishment of an independent Palestinian state, as that option may offer an ultimate 
solution for the refugees and their right of return. However, Prime Minister Benjamin 
Netanyahu’s recent announcement that his government does not accept a full Palestinian 
state neighboring Israel, but could instead offer something less than a state with no 
security control, sends a signal that such rigid mindsets do not engender optimism for a 
solution to the Palestinian refugee crisis in the near future.  
 
5.3. Feasibility of the Right of Return for Palestinian Refugees 
Realistically speaking, a big question remains to be answered if the Palestinian dream 
of return were to become a reality, would Palestinian refugees return to Israel or 
Palestine? In my opinion, the right of return for the Palestinians is a principle, and there is 
a difference between the principle and its implementation. Most Palestinians want to have 
the right of return not to necessarily make the decision to return to their homelands prior 
to 1948 and 1967, but rather to be given the option to or be compensated in case they 
chose not to return. One big factor that influences what Palestinian refugees would decide 
if they were granted the option to act upon their right to return to their towns in historic 
Palestine, or to even return to a Palestinian State in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, is their 
current living situation in their respective locations. For instance, the Palestinian 
Research and Studies Center in Nablus conducted a diverse sample of 1271 people of the 
population of the refugee camps in Gaza and the West Bank. The study found that 25% 
of those surveyed would prefer resettling elsewhere (i.e. leaving the refugee camps), 47% 
would like to continue living in their camps with improved conditions of life, while 20% 
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are willing to continue living in their current housing even without improving conditions. 
What this shows is that, nearly half of the refugees surveyed were willing to remain in 
their respective residences in Gaza Strip or the West Bank, under the condition of 
improving their living situations. However, I believe that it is important to highlight that 
the study was conducted in May 1995, a relatively peaceful period during which the 
Palestinian Authority began building what was meant to be the foundation for a 
Palestinian State. Certainly, if the same survey where to be done nowadays, after 23 years 
of no significant improvement in refugees’ living situation but rather worsening, the 
numbers of refugees willing to stay in their respective places of residence in Gaza Strip 
or the West Bank would be much lower; those refugees are more likely to hold on to their 
right of return and demand its implementation (Zureik, 1996, p. 6).     
Palestinian researcher Basma Q. Darwish also conducted studies in the Palestinian 
refugee camps in Lebanon and Jordan. She found that about half of the refugees would 
want to apply the right of return. She also found that about one-third of the people in the 
Jordanian sample said that, in any case, even if a sovereign Palestinian State is 
established, they will prefer to remain in Jordan, because most of the refugees in Jordan 
are naturalized and have jobs, some of whom are even considered wealthy (Zureik, 1996, 
p. 8). 
However, Palestinian refugees in Lebanon would mostly support returning to their 
pre-1948 and pre-1967 villages, because their living conditions are the worst compared to 
other Palestinian refugees elsewhere. As described by journalist Paula Schmitt, a 
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Brazilian journalist, Middle East correspondent, and author of the non-fiction 
book, Advertised to Death – Lebanese Poster-Boys, 
 “There are more than 70 professions denied to Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, 
for example, and over 80 of them in Jordan. In neither country can they work 
even as a taxi driver, for that would require a driver’s license and most of them 
cannot legally possess one. In Lebanon, even the materials necessary for building 
a refugee shack are regulated by law – bricks and a proper roof are too permanent, 
and thus illegal.” (Schmitt, 2014) 
Finally, I would like to weigh in as Palestinian refugee who was born and grew up 
in Jabalia refugee camp, one of the largest Palestinian camps in Gaza Strip. My family 
has received UNRWA benefits such as health, education and other services for decades. 
Our situation was not as bad as the other refugees in Lebanon, for instance. However, we 
always were taught to express our demand to return to our pre-1948 Brier village, 
currently within the borders of Israel, because our situation was not as good in the camp 
as my family had in the village. My family had estates and farms that they cultivated and 
harvested, this was considered the source of their livelihood. My family members that 
currently live in Gaza continue to express that they would return to what is now Israel if 
given the chance. I used to be on the same page with them, but since moving to the U.S., 
I am not sure if I would go back to the unknown of returning to a village that my family 
left 45 years before I was born. If my family’s living conditions in Jabalia refugee camp 
were better, if my siblings and their children could receive proper education and 
healthcare, I doubt they would be so inclined to go back to Brier village.  
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Additionally, if I, or any Palestinian refugee, do in fact return to our historic villages 
that existed 70 years ago, what would we be returning to? Places that do not exist 
anymore? Homes that already have Israelis living in them for 3 generations? Simply put, 
it is neither pragmatic nor practical to expect that the actual physical application of the 
right to return is feasible. Rather, Palestinian refugees nowadays, in my opinion, are 
looking for acknowledgment that they were forced to leave their homes out of fear for 
their lives, and that in theory, they do have the right to return or be compensated; 
although I believe the majority will opt for compensation knowing that repatriation is far 
too complicated for implementation. In fact, the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey 
Research (PSR) surveyed the views of refugee families living inside and outside the 
refugee camps. Studies have been conducted on 4,506 refugees in Jordan, Lebanon and 
the occupied territories where they wish to live if they have a choice. Only 10% of 
Palestinians want to return to and live in a Jewish state. Of these, only 10% wanted Israeli 
citizenship or Israeli passports, while 90% percent prefer Palestinian citizenship and a 
Palestinian passport (Hanley, 2003). 
To distill what in my opinion is a good start to end the issue of Palestinian refugees 
once and for all, Israel should acknowledge its responsibility for displacing Palestinians 
in 1948 and 1967, followed by agreement between Israelis and Palestinians on a 
pragmatic form of an optional right of return to a Palestinian State that is given a true 
chance at surviving via economic and security independence from Israeli Occupation. 
This requires infrastructure and financial and economic potential for the future 
Palestinian State to be able to absorb the large number of refugees that may choose to 
return. Those that choose not to return to a Palestinian State should benefit from 
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rehabilitation programs within their host countries, and should be offered citizenship and 
equal rights wherever they are. However, pragmatic solutions are not always the most 
popular as people tend to hold on to their inherited beliefs. Some on the Israeli side will 
continue to deny any responsibility for the forced migration of Palestinians, and others on 
the Palestinian side will continue to demand the application of the right of return and 
leaving the option for each Palestinian refugee to decide whether they want to return or 
not to their no-longer-existing homes and farms.   
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